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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
mit restoration of the privilege to records normally private, except for the
record-keeping requirement, without limiting the power of the govern-
ment to secure information necessary for its effective operation. As one
commentator suggests, extension of the required-records doctrine to an
area "permeated with criminal statutes" would invite complete nullifica-
tion of the privilege by a network of registration statutes. 9
Donald J. Burns
EMINENT DOMAIN-RIPARIAN RIGHTs-The Supreme Court reaffirms its
decision in United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956)
and holds that the government may disregard the value of land arising
from the fact of riparian location in compensating the owner when fast
lands are appropriated.
United States v. Rands, 88 S. Ct. 265 (1967).
In United States v. Rands1 the owner of riparian land on the Columbia
River in Oregon had leased his land to the State, with an option to buy.
The land was to be used as an industrial park, and part of it was to be
used as a port. The United States Government, however, condemned the
land and reconveyed it to Oregon at a price much lower than that of the
option price for which the owner had expected to sell. The value of the
land determined by the judge in the condemnation proceeding was limited
to its value for sand, gravel, and agricultural purposes. Its special value
as a port site was not taken into consideration, and consequently the
owner received about one-fifth of the claimed value of the land as a port
site.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision,2 con-
cluding that port site value was an element of "just compensation" under
the Fifth Amendment, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.8
The Court, apparently desiring to dispel any possibility of future
doubts and ambiguities in the lower courts' decisions on this question,
emphatically reaffirmed the controversial United States v. Twin City
Power Co.,' which held that the United States Government, when appro-
priating lands riparian to a navigable stream for use as a power site, does
not have to compensate the owner for the added value of his land which
inures to it due to the flow of the stream. Although asked to distinguish
between the added Value of land when condemned for use as a power site,
49. McKay, supra note 2, at 222.
1. United States v. Rands, 88 S. Ct. 265 (1967).
2. United States v. Rands, 367 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1966).
3. 88 S. Ct. 265 (1967).
4. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
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as in Twin City, and that of land condemned for use as a port site, as in
this case, the decision in Rands stated that just as the water in a navigable
stream may be the source of power and thus the ultimate source of any
added value, a tract of land might have as a potential power site, so also
the water in a river must be seen as the added source of any added value
a tract of land on the bank of the river might have as a potential port
site. The Court stated that in both instances, these values are considered
not to be inherent in the property itself, and thus are not "property"
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, the value depends
upon the use of the water of a navigable stream, to which private persons
have no right as against the United States. Thus, the Court concluded, no
distinction can be drawn between these uses with regard to the duty to
compensate riparian owners for land taken under an eminent domain
proceeding of the United States.
The Commerce Clause5 is the source of much of the governmental
activity, and it has been interpreted so broadly that the powers flowing
from it are numerous. Thus, when property borders on a navigable
stream, the title to such property is held subject to a public easement for
purposes of navigation.' In United States v. Twin City Power Co.,7 the
damming of the river precluded "navigation" of vessels, but the Court
held that development of power sources on navigable streams is within
the sphere of the United States Government under the Commerce Clause.
When the public interest requires that the Government take over
private property for public use, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
requires that just compensation be paid to the owner. What is "property"
and what is "just compensation"? Generally speaking, "property ... is
the creation of law and a man who has property has certain legal rights
with respect to an item of wealth."8 In Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States,9 the Court stated that the value of property is determined
by its productiveness, i.e., the profits which the owner receives from its
use. The United States Government there claimed that the right of an
owner to have property in the river (a franchise to collect tolls) was con-
ditional only, and that the Government could destroy this right. The Court
disagreed: such interests of a riparian owner were vested rights of prop-
erty, just as ownership of tangible property, which could only be taken
with just compensation. In its opinion, the Court stated that full and just
compensation is a natural equity which is inextricably bound with the
power of eminent domain, and that "in [the] Fifth Amendment there is
stated the exact limitation on the power of the government to take private
5. U.S. CONrST. Art. 1 § 8, d. 3.
6. 1 ViLL. L. REV. 167, 168 (1956).
7. 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
8. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 739 (1964).
9. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
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property for public use."'" It was stated that the Courts must always be
watchful for steady encroachments on this right. "Compensation" means
"equivalent," and is expressly emphasized by the use of the word "just"
in the Fifth Amendment." The Court in Rands dismissed the Mononga-
hela case as primarily one of estoppel, although this was not the only
basis for the decision, which held that the added value of the franchise,
arising from the use of a navigable river, had to be compensated for by
the Federal Government. It would seem questionable to say that the
Court in Monongahela did not in fact give compensation to "a riparian
land owner for a property right deriving its value from the flow of
the stream." 2
The lower court in Twin City held the "value of riparian rights appur-
tenant to condemned land on a navigable stream constitutes an element of
just compensation under the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion." 8 In determining "just compensation," what the property is worth
in the market is examined, looking not only at the uses to which it is put,
but at those to which it is plainly adapted.'4 Market value is based on the
highest and most profitable use to which it is likely to be put in the near
future.' 5 "The absolute ownership and the right of private property in
such lands is not varied by the fact that it borders on a navigable
stream."' 6 In both Twin City and in Rands, the Court seems to have
ignored the test of fair market value. If a private company had con-
demned the land pursuant to a right given it by the Federal Government,
it would have had to pay the added value based on its suitability for an
intended use. 7 In both of these cases the land was not only suitable for
the use, but such use had been contemplated and expected. United States
v. Miller'" stated that where a property has a determinable market value,
that is "just compensation." In both cases, the market value had been
ascertained prior to the condemnation proceedings.
When the United States condemns "fast lands," it is required to pay
the fair market value, including such value as the land may have due to
the uses to which it is put. But when the Government condemns riparian
lands, it is held that such special values are allocable to the public, and
not to private interests; otherwise a private owner would receive a wind-
fall to which he is not entitled.'9 Even when the owner has paid a price
10. Id., at 626.
11. Id.
12. 30 TULANE L. REV. 593, 594 (1956).
13. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 215 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1954).
14. Mississippi & R.R. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1876).
15. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
16. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166,'183 (1871).
17. 10 S.W.L.J. 319, 321 (1956).
18. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
19. United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926).
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for the land which includes its special value, it is held subject to the public
easement for purposes of navigation, and the owner takes with notice of
such easement. In United States v. Commodore Park, Inc.,2" the Court
stated that it has always been the law in this country that a riparian
owner does not acquire a property right distinct from those of the general
public in the waters of a navigable stream. This has never been disputed.
These rights and values are not property within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment, are not assertable against the United States, and need not
be paid for when appropriated by the United States.
The doctrine that is often espoused in support of the difference in the
concept of "just compensation" for fast lands and for riparian lands is
that in order to develop the greatest public utility of a waterway, private
convenience must often suffer without compensation.2 The trend of the
cases following this concept led to the decision in United States v. River
Rouge Improvement Co.,22 which held that when other parts of riparian
property taken by the Federal Government have diminished value because
of the Government's action, no additional compensation will be paid; but
if the remaining property receives added value because of a special and
direct benefit to the land resulting from the action, the additional value is
deducted from the purchase price. 23 The distinction caused confusion in
subsequent cases, and in dispelling this, United States v. Rands24 stated
that this is not an inconsistency, for in neither instance can the private
owner of riparian land benefit at the public's expense. However, the Court
in River Rouge did not consider the fact that the benefits conferred by
the improvements to the remaining portion of the property could be
revoked by the Government at any time.
In Yates v. Milwaukee, 5 the Court stated that riparian rights are
property, and are valuable. These cases have not claimed that the United
States does not have the right to condemn lands bordering on a navigable
stream for navigational purposes, nor that the riparian owner has a prop-
erty right in the waters; but Twin City contradicts them by extending the
Government's navigational servitude in the adjacent fast lands above the
high-water mark. The dissenting opinion in Twin City posed the question
of whether riparian land derives its value solely from the flow of the
stream. It stated that although the owner of the land in question does not
own the water value of the river, neither does the Government have any
20. United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
21. South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 166 U.S. 269
(1897).
22. 269 U.S. 411 (1926).
23. § 6 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1918; 40 STAT. 911, 33 U.S.C. 595 (1918).
24. 88 S. Ct. 265 (1967).
25. Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497 (1871).
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navigational servitude over the adjacent fast lands above the high-water.
mark; and neither would be of any value without the other.
The conflicting opinions before Twin City was decided are shown
nowhere more clearly than in United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co.26 The case involved the price that the Government should pay
for two riparian pieces of property. One lot was used as a factory site,
involving a dam for use as a power source. The Government said that here
the land had no value apart from the flow of the stream, and that the
Company was seeking extra value in the water power itself, which it
cannot own. The other lot was intended to be used for a lock and canal,
and since this would aid navigation and was the only property in the
vicinity available for such purpose, the Court said that the land had
special value apart from the flow of the stream. The distinction seems
nebulous: as regards the lock and canal site, its value necessarily arose
from and continuously involved the use of waters from the river, as did
the power site.
Since Chandler-Dunbar did not unquestionably rule out the possibility
that the demand for potential uses of riparian land would be considered
a factor in determining the fair market value of such lands, there was still
doubt about the Government's "dominant navigational servitude" and
"fair market value" for riparian lands. Twin City offered an opportunity
for the Supreme Court to distinguish this question more clearly. The
Court there stated that it was following Chandler-Dunbar, and did so as
to the part of Chandler-Dunbar pertaining to the added value of land as
a factory site; concluding that since the special value of the riparian land
in question results from the flow of the stream, it inures to the naviga-
tional servitude of the Federal Government.
Twin City aimed at finally deciding the problem, and caused much
controversy at the time. However, the question left open by Chandler-
Dunbar in its distinction of the value of the two lots, and not settled by
Twin City, was still in doubt, so that the lower federal courts continued
to hand down conflicting decisions when the application of Twin City was
not certain. United States v. Rands,27 mindful of the doubt, merely stated
that it was following the principles of Twin City, and that to the extent
that Chandler-Dunbar was inconsistent with that decision, it was to be
Twin City which controlled.
The decision in Rands illustrates the changes that have occurred in
determining when full and just compensation for riparian lands appro-
priated for the public use must be given. Early cases have held that the
United States Government can impair or destroy a riparian owner's access
26. 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
27. 88 S. Ct. 265 (1967).
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to navigable waters without payment, pursuant to its power of eminent
domain. In Gibson v. United States2 8 and Scranton v. Wheeler,29 where a
dyke and a pier, respectively, were erected with the ensuing loss of the
riparian owners' access to the waters, the Courts stated that such erec-
tions for navigational improvement did not entitle the owners to compen-
sation, even though their access was destroyed. These are rights, the
Courts said, which are acquired subject to the rights which the public
has in the navigation of the waters.
It has often been held that the riparian owner's right of access is a
property right, from the front of his land to the navigable part of the
stream.8" The loss of such right without compensation is based on the
rationale that such appropriations are not a "taking" of private property,
but are only a "consequential injury" to a right which must always be
enjoyed in due subjection to the rights of the public. The United States
may divert navigable waters without paying any compensation to owners
of riparian lands for loss of value, since it is an "incidental injury" pur-
suant to a proper exercise of the Governmental power. Again, Courts have
held that a flooding and subsequent injury which destroyed a man's
property is a mere "consequential damage" resulting from the exercise of
the public right to improve navigation, and that such injury did not
amount to a "taking" under the Constitution. 1 The rationale has been
that, due to the Government's navigational servitude, the individual
owned nothing, and therefore lost nothing. 2 This reasoning is at least
understandable in the cases involving the diversion of waters with conse-
quent loss of access, but becomes much less so in the cases where property
is injured by "incidental" flooding, pursuant to navigational improve-
ment.
In United States v. Rr. Willow Improvement Co.,"8 the Court stated
that the mere fact that riparian owners are damaged by the operations of
the Government in aid of navigation does not give the Courts power to
require compensation when there is not an "actual taking" of property.
The obligation extends only to a taking. In order to come within the
provision of the Fifth Amendment, there must have been an exercise by
the United States with a proprietary right in the property taken; the
taking must have been an intentional appropriation of the property to the
public use; and the appropriation must have been authorized by law. 4
28. 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
29. 179 U.S. 141 (1900).
30. United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926).
31. Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897), citing Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
Coons, 6 W. & S. 101 (1843).
32. 9 VAND. L. REV. 565, 566 (1965).
33. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
34. Vansant v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 562 (1933).
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Following this rationale, property that is "incidentally injured" falls
outside of the Fifth Amendment protection.
However, in Yates, it was held that a riparian owner's property
"cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously destroyed or impaired."3 5 The
earlier cases, holding that a riparian owner's right of access could be
taken without compensation concerned a certain "line" which had length
but not width. Land above that line was compensable, either for damage
done, or in a "taking." 6 After Chandler-Dunbar and Twin City, the effect
of the dominant servitude of the United States Government in an evalua-
tion of riparian "fast" land was not so clear. 7 From the decision in
Rands, it would appear that the width of this line can be extended back
onto the riparian owner's property as far as the Government wishes it to
go. The basis for this is that the cases have seemed to hold that riparian
land has value simply because it borders on a navigable stream, and that,
pursuant to its navigational servitude, the United States does not have to
pay for such special values which may inure to the land above the high-
water mark.
It is difficult to understand how such an extension came about. In
United States v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. Co.,"5 it was stated that the public
easement of navigation is limited to natural levels, widths, and flows of a
navigable stream, and that riparian owners have a right to erect and
maintain their property in reliance on those limitations; although the
Government may increase the burden of the natural servitude, it may not
do so without just compensation. Now, it seems, a riparian owner buys and
improves his land at his peril.
The Court in Rands ignored the disturbing question as to just com-
pensation for the option contract between the riparian owner and the
State of Oregon for his land, which became ineffective when the United
States condemned the land. In Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States,"9
compensation for a contract of the company was involved in the proceed-
ing. The Court distinguished "destruction" from "taking," stating that
the contract was property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
and that if it had been "taken" for public use, the Government would
have been liable for full compensation. The action of the Government,
however, invalidated the contract, and thus it was "destroyed."
Valid contracts are property, which cannot be taken without
just compensation, whether obligor be private individual, mu-
35. 10 Wall. 497 (1871).
36. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947).
37. 7 SYRAcusE LAW REVIEW 356 (1965).
38. 90 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1937).
39. 261 U.S. 502 (1923).
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nicipality, or United States [and] are protected by the Fifth
Amendment."
It seems difficult to say that in Rands the option contract was "inci-,
dentally destroyed" pursuant to the United States Government's right to
improve navigation. The land was reconveyed to Oregon for the same
apparent purpose contemplated in the original option contract, but for a
much lower price, thus effectively extinguishing the riparian owner's right
to the price stated in the option contract. The option price thus falls
within the numerous cases which hold that just compensation involves
every element of fair market value, including special value, based on the
highest and most profitable use to which the property is adaptable and
likely to be put in the near future, and such use which the owner
intended. 1 The test for just compensation stated in Boston Chamber of
Commerce v. Boston42 was to be "... what has the owner lost, not what
the taker gained."43
Due to the Commerce Clause, the Federal Government has complete
control over navigable streams for purposes of regulating and improving
navigation, and thus, riparian land has been given different considerations
in ascertaining its value in an eminent domain proceeding. The result is
that riparian rights can be extinguished. It would seem that special value
should be compensated for in taking riparian lands by the Federal Gov-
ernment; if not, the Government is extending its navigational servitude
onto the fast lands above the high-water mark, and thus violating the
Fifth Amendment directive as to full and just compensation, which is
applied to inland property.
In view of increasing governmental activity in all fields, it is significant
that such a solid reaffirmance of Twin City has been made. The two cases
show that the Government's navigational servitude is as broad as its
power over commerce. However, the individual should not be made to
bear the loss for a project which is intended to benefit the whole com-
munity.44
The Bill of Rights is the individual's legal protection against oppressive
government power.45 The owner of fast lands, although subject to eminent
domain, has a property right good against all the world, including the
United States Government, with regard to fair market value. Twin City
Power Co. and Rands seem to give the riparian owner only a "quasi-
40. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
41. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States 148 U.S. 312 (1893); Olson v. United
States, 292 U.S. 246 (1876) ; Mississippi & R.R. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1876).
42. 217 U.S. 189 (1910).
43. Id. at 195.
44. Reich, supra, note 8 at 785.
45. Id. at 760.
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property" right, good against all the world except the United States Gov-
ernment. However, when the land is particularly suitable for the use to
which it is going to be put, and such use has been intended by the owner,
it would seem not only possible, but just, to draw a balance between the
theory of the dominant servitude, and the theory of fair market value, as
is done in an eminent domain proceeding of fast lands.46
Irrespective of the many opinions of "just compensation," the im-
portance of Rands is that it intended to eliminate doubt and to end the
lower courts' indecision on the question of fair market value for riparian
lands. The Court summarily dismissed Monongahela as a case "pri-
marily" one of estoppel; explained the supposed "inconsistency" of River
Rouge; and expressly overruled the distinction made in Chandler-Dunbar
which gave added value to the lock and canal site.
In view of the history of the cases concerning eminent domain pro-
ceedings for riparian lands, it seems that the later Courts have centered
not so much on the issue of what elements of value full and just com-
pensation encompasses, but when it is to be paid. If the riparian land
owner's right of access is taken, or if the land is "incidentally destroyed,"
compensation is not required. By construing the value of riparian lands
in eminent domain proceedings to "inure to it due to the flow of the
stream," full and just compensation is avoided, as United States v. Rands
illustrates.
Jean McGuinness
CORPORATIONS-PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL-Corporate Tort-The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit holds that the cor-
porate entity will be disregarded to hold a shareholder liable for a cor-
porate tort only where the tort claimant can prove that the corporation
was formed with a specific intent to escape personal liability for a specific
tort or class of torts.
Zubik v. Zubik & Sons, Inc., 384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 88 S. Ct. 1183 (1968).
Plaintiffs in the instant case sustained injuries when barges owned by
defendant Charles Zubik, Sr. broke loose from their moorings in an ice
flow. The barges had been leased to defendant Zubik & Sons, Inc., a firm
in which Charles Zubik, Sr. was the principal shareholder. The United
States District Court entered multiple admiralty judgments totaling
$207,504 against Charles Zubik, Sr. and Zubik & Sons, Inc., a closely
held corporation which had assets of only $67,000.'
46. Supra, note 37 at 359.
1. 384 F.2d at 271.
[Vol. 6:310
